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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1953
Home-rule charter cities, however, have the authority to enact ordinances
to punish participants in lotteries who derive no profit therefrom.8
Commission of an accused to Lima State Hospital for one month on the
unsworn statement of the prosecutor as to his belief of insamty based on
hearsay without formal hearing or presentation of evidence denied the
accused his liberty without due process of law. He was freed after a habeas
corpus hearing.'
Delegation of authority by the General Assembly to the Board of Liquor
Control to adopt arbitrarily, without any standards prescribed, minmum
mark-up prices for wine, and to fix minimum mark-up prices for wine
distribution at wholesale or retail was held constitutional.10 The private
business of wine-selling is carried on as a privilege. It is not such an or-
dinary lawful business which is a property right protected by the Ohio Con-
stitution. Liquor selling involves public interest; states have historically
regulated rates and prices of such businesses. This case carries the delegation
of authority to an administrative body to the utmost limits. Rate-making and
price fixing for public utility rates, for example, are delegated with general
standards prescribed. Unreasonable rate fixing is unconstitutional. Per-
haps the subject-matter of liquor is so inherently in need of regulation that
arbitrary action is permitted. Generally, from a legal point of view, arbi-
trary is synonymous with unconstitutional.
To deny Negroes the right to rent in a public housing project erected
with public funds violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution as well as the Federal Civil Rights Act and may be the basis
for a mandatory injunction to compel admittance.11
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CONTRACTS
Restrictive Covenant in Employment Contract
A declaratory judgment action was brought in Segal v. Fletscher to
determine whether a restrictive covenant which the plaintiff was required to
insert in contracts with salesmen employed by the plaintiff to sell the de-
" State ex rel. English v. Ind. Comm n, 115 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio 1953)
'Columbus v. Barr, 115 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio 1953).
'State ex fel. Similak v. Bushong, 159 Ohio St. 259, 111 N.E.2d 918 (1953).
" Blackman v. Board of Liquor Control, 65 Ohio L Abs. 97, 113 N.E.2d 893, app.
dis'm 158 Ohio St. 368, 109 N.E.2d 475 (1952).
'Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio
1953).
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fendant's products was valid.. The covenant restricted the- salesmen, during
their employment, and for five years after the termination thereof, from en-
gaging in, or accepting employment from, or becoming interested in, a busi-
ness. similar to the business carried on by the defendant. Held: Since the
covenant contained no restrictions as to space, it failed to meet the require-
ment of being reasonably limited as to space, and was therefore invalid.
Infant: Disaffirmance of Contract; Recovery from Agent
for Undisclosed Principal
--In Datko v. Gieb, the plaintiff, a minor, contracted to purchase an auto-
mobile from defendant and paid defendant the full purchase price. After
delivery, the plaintiff offered to return the car and demanded return of his
money on the ground that he was a minor. The defendant refused. After
purchase of the car, the plaintiff learned for the first tune that defendant had
been acting as an agent for one Beckert who was the owner of the car, and
that the certificate of title was in Becket's name. The certificate had been
signed in blank by Beckett and delivered in this form by the defendant to
the plaintiff. Upon trial,-after theforegoing evidence was introduced, and
upon the defendant's motion for judgment at conclusion of the plaintiff's
case, the court granted- the motion for the reason that the defendant did not
have the certificate of title to the car in his name. The plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals, per curiam, held that the motor vehicle title law wa.
not involved, and that where the defendant acted for an undisclosed prin-
cipal, making the contract- in his own name, he was bound by his contract
and the infant purchaser -had the right to look to him for the return of the
money upon disaffirmance of the agreement.
Rec6overy by Defaulting Contractor
Despite earlier case law of Ohio to the contrary, the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals in Kirkland v. Archbold held that defaulting contractor
who has by his labor and materials materially enriched the estate of the other
party, should be afforded relief to the reasonable value of the work done,
less whatever damage the other party to the contract has suffered, notwith-
standing that the defaulting plaintiff's performance did not constitute
substantial performance.
Cost Plus Fee Contract: Amount of Recovery
In Burton, Inc. v. Durkee,4 the court held that in an action by a building
contractor to recover the unpaid balance under a cost plus fee contract, the
builder is not limited in his recovery to only that amount which he can
'93 Ohio App. 315, 113 N.E.2d 608 (1952)
113 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio App. 1953)
,113 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio App. 1953)
'158 Ohio St. 313, 109 N.E.2d 265 (1952)
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